I. Introduction
Banking system as a subset of financial system plays a vital role in the economic growth and development of an economy. As financial intermediaries, banks assist in channelling funds from surplus economic units to deficit areas to facilitate business transactions and economic development generally. Since these funds are owned by third parties, prudence demands that such funds should be efficiently managed to sustain the confidence of depositors in the banking system, enhance efficiency, ensure the continued soundness of the system itself and thereby minimize the risk of bank failures (Oluranti, 1991) . In the Nigerian financial sector, poor managerial performance and poor corporate governance (CG) had been identified as the major factors in virtually all known cases of a financial institution's distress in the country which even led to consolidation reform in 2004 , and yet re-emerged afterwards, and led to another reform in late 2009 that necessitated the bail-out of ten (10) banks which nearly collapsed due to high non-performing loans, poor CG, bad liquidity and risk management (CBN, 2010) . The bail-out reform became the only rescue program which could ensure the continuous survival of the banking industry by injecting N620 billion. This bail-out reform generated a lot of panic and doubt concerning the status of the investments of these banks' depositors, shareholders and other Nigerians consequently, led to a sparked interest in examining the potential outcome of this reform through researches.
However, this paper aims at proposing a framework that could examine the potential relevance of board equity ownership (BEO) in influencing the relationship between CG and the performance of these bail-out banks. This study is hence is proposing a framework that selects the most appropriate board variables that best address the banks' CG problems peculiar to Nigeria, and introducing a moderating variable (BEO) that will strengthen the inconsistent conflicting relationship between CG and banks performance indirectly, as suggested Hillman & Dalziel, (2003) and Zahra & Pearce, (1989) . This framework, unique as it is, aims at covering only the bailed-out banks with a total of 2,811 branches in Nigeria using a primary source of data (questionnaire). There is paucity of studies that use BEO as moderating variable that captures board control or monitoring role which addresses the Nigerian bail-out banks, hence the need to be introduced into these inconclusive findings.
Due to the financial crisis that hit the globe, the mid 2000s saw a renewed academic interest in the field of CG and firm performance. However, most researches conducted globally and Nigeria in particular, are having some kind of shortcomings which results in usual conflicting findings like: inconsistent operationalization of board variables, limited scope, and convenience samples, and usual focus mainly on the direct relationships between board variables and firm's performance, thus ignoring the indirect path (through roles and strategic initiatives (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) . Studies in the Nigerian context which adopts a moderating variable that captures board control or monitoring role are very rare, hence the need to be introduced into these inconclusive relations/findings. Also, most of the studies on CG in Nigerian context are either conducted before the banks' bail-out, or not in the area of bail-out reform or not covering the banking sector such as Adekoya, (2011) .This study therefore, propose two out of its four board variables and make proposition in this paper which reflect directors' monitoring role (driven by agency theory). Additionally, these variables were actually selected based on their prominent importance in solving the practical problem of corporate governance in Nigerian banks as mentioned in (Sanusi & CBN, 2010 ).
Board Monitoring function (Agency theory based)
According to the agency theorists, firms are often characterized by a conflict of interest between firms' management and shareholders, where managers usually exploit their control over firm operations to increase their short-term wealth at the expense of shareholders' long-term interests as opined by Fama & Jensen, (1983) and Jensen & Meckling, (1976 , 1999) .However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has been conducted using these selected variables together in a single framework on the Nigerian bail-out banks. Therefore, these board characteristics are proposed to examine their indirect effect on banks' performance with the influence of a moderator (board equity ownership) due to the inconclusive, conflicting findings about the relationship of these variables to firm performance (Baron & Kenny, 1986 ). Also, since boards' ownership is found to be related to firm performance, then it can moderate CG to performance.
III. Board Equity Ownership (Moderator)
Practically, the implementation of CBN code of corporate governance in Nigeria, posed some challenges, prominent among which were: ambiguities regarding the appointment of independent directors and the share ownership status of these independent directors(CBN, 2008). Thus, it has been an unresolved debate concerning the potential importance/ effect of board members' equity ownership on both the board functional performance and firm performance. Albring et al. (2013) , opined that in the USA, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), among others, suggests that director stock ownership should reduce agency problems and therefore the need for external monitoring. Thus, in an attempt to make a proper alignment of the interest of director and shareholders, many boards have implemented stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements for directors, leading to a substantial rise in the ownership of managers and directors but in Nigeria, there exist ambiguities and challenges regarding the directors share ownership status (CBN, 2008) .
There exist conflicting researchers views regarding this which uptil now, no clear position is given by the CBN. This show the real extent of the misconception on whether or not equity ownership by the board of Directors would influence their mandated functions. Also, the percentage of the shareholding is still not clearly determined. However, Bhagat . Similarly, Weisbach, (1988) also reported that CEO replacement in poorly performing firms was greater as the representation of independent outside directors increases. Board members (both executive and nonexecutive) share ownership reduces manager/shareholder conflicts. To the extent that executive board members own part of the firm, they develop shareholder-like interests and are less likely to engage in behaviour that is detrimental to firms' / shareholders interest. In support, Kren and Kerr, (1997) shows that boards with significant holdings are more likely to link CEO pay to firm performance and replace CEOs of poorly performing firms (Bhagat & Black, 2000) .
On the contrary view, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) reported no correlation between board's ownership and firm performance, and opined that there trivial support for the divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that contribution of board's ownership is considered as a "twoedged knife" in which there is an optimal level of board ownership which contributes positively to a firm's performance. However, the study of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) revealed that firm performance first improves as ownership rises up to 5%, then falls as ownership increases up to 25% and then rises slightly at higher ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide further evidence on the relation between the distribution of equity ownership and firm value and find a significant curvilinear relation between them. By and large, board ownership, was viewed as an encouragement that will help board members supervise management in a more efficient way. (2008)that, if these banks' board of directors were having a substantial equity ownership in the banks or compensated with equity as incentives for a targeted performance, they would definitely have monitored and counselled those sacked incompetent/fraudulent banks' managements. In the current aftermath of banking crisis, it is plausible that higher ownership could motivate directors to monitor and provide resources (advices, counsel connections etc.) to management which will in-turn lead to higher firm performance in the long run. Thus, we form the following proposition: P.1 Banks are more likely to have better performance as the share ownership of the board of directors' increases. P.2 Share ownership of board of directors has a relationship with the banks' performance after the bail-out.
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Independent variables (IV)
Board independence (IV)
In Nigeria, many banks' boards lacked independence, the bank chairman/CEO often had an overbearing influence on the board, resulting to directors failing to make sound contributions in safeguarding the growth and development of their banks. (Sanusi & CBN, 2010) . Board independence is still one of the provisions of the CBN code that , CBN on-site verification reports of some institutions revealed non-compliance with (CBN, 2008) . However, prior evidence of agency theory based researches (Fama & Jensen, 1983 .Previous researches revealed that the higher the concentration of independent directors on the board, the higher will be the level of effective monitoring by the board (Albring et al., 2013; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991) . This is because CEOs have less power over independent directors, as their careers are not dependent on the CEO, thus no any obligation between them.
Also, independent directors and other directors who own shares will be more likely to monitor rigorously (de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) . Since the studies of (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Boyd, 1994) reveals that compensating boards with equity and their level of equity ownership moderates the relationship between the board's ability to monitor/ provide resources and their actual monitoring/resources provision. Weisbach, (1988) also reported that CEO replacement in poorly performing firms was greater as the representation of independent outside directors increases. Consistent with these findings and the above-mentioned arguments on board independence, and board equity ownership, this study argues that board equity ownership could influence the independent directors' functional ability to monitor or provide resources to management which will in-turn enhance the banks' performance. Also, further argues that a board with a higher concentration of independent directors is more likely to objectively direct knowledge and expertise toward monitoring banks' performance after the bail-out. Thus, we form the following proposition: P.3 Board members independence is positively related to Banks performance after the bail-out. P.4Board equity ownership moderates the relationship between Independent board members monitoring functions and banks' performance after the bail-out.
Audit committee quality (IV)
This is indeed a very sensitive board attribute that provides monitoring control roles of boards. Albring et al. (2013) reported that the best measure of audit committee quality is accounting financial expertise, because the perceived lack of accounting and financial expertise by boards and audit committees triggered a widespread regulatory and public attention (Hilzenrath, 2002) . A competent and effective audit committee could improve the credibility and reliability of the financial statements provided to users (Abernathy, Herrmann, Kang, & Krishnan, 2013). Frequent evaluations of CEO and firm performance by the board or a standing committee will result in feedback for appropriate corrective actions (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) . They also, opined that the structure of a board also plays a vital role in determining directors' success in executing their control roles. This is because, an audit committee that has competent directors and well run, and also, the directors' accessibility to timely and reliable control data is highly inevitable in evaluating both management and firm performance and also enables them to monitor progress in achieving company goals especially through performance measurement (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) . In this study, we proxy the audit committee quality as to the presence of a competent (professional accountant or financial expertise, i.e. practicing auditor /financial analysts). However, recent researches tend to focus on the competence of audit committee as against their previous focus on independence. This is because only board members who are financially educated (accountants or auditors), can be able to diagnose the true& fairness of the firm's financial report even before publishing and monitors the frequent performance measurement of CEO, top management staff and the business units of the firm in order to ensure survival of these banks after the bail-out reform.
However, previous research suggests that audit committees with financial experts as members are more effective at monitoring the process and quality of financial reporting especially in ; the effects of materiality justification and accounting precision 
IV. Banks Performance
Organisational performance is an important concept that relates to the way and manner in which financial, material and human resources available to an organization are judiciously used to achieve the overall corporate objective of an organisation. Various measurement models were previously developed to take care of either managerial or organisational or both performance. However, among them all this study adopts the Balance scorecard (BSC) performance model which was developed by Kaplan & Norton, (1996) . Balance scorecard model provides an excellent system for performance measurement in the commercial banking industry Bremser and Chung(2005) . The BSC is the major element of a strategic management system that enables organizations to translate strategic goals into measures of performance. The measures consist both financial and non-financial measures which serves as indicators used in monitoring strategy implementation throughout the organization and whether strategic goals are being achieved or not (Bremser & Chung, 2005) .The framework comprises of four (1 financial, and 3 non-financial aspects (customer perspective, internal process, learning & growth).
Figure 1 Proposed Framework
V. Conclusion
This paper is a proposes a framework based on an ongoing research, to examine the influence of equity shareholding in motivating Board of directors of banks and improving their functional effectiveness in monitoring the managements' overall strategic system of control which will results in a better banks performance after the reform. If this proposed framework is validated and the study completed, the finding will provide significant contribution to the literature, managers and regulators.
